The focus of this book is on the theory of infinity in Lawrence of Lindores' commentary on Aristotle's “Physics”. Written shortly before 1400, Lindores' text played an important role in disseminating the natural philosophy of John Buridan and his disciples in the 15th century. In the first part of this book, Lindores' concept of science is discussed and a detailed analysis of his treatment of infinity and related topics (continuity, the eternity of the world) is given. Subsequently an assessment of (...) his ideas from the point of view of modern mathematics is attempted and some interesting similarities between medieval theories of infinity and recent developments in mathematics are outlined. The second part contains the relevant questions from Lindores' commentary (book I, qu. 1-5, 10; book III, qu. 13-18; book VI, qu. 9-10; book VIII, qu. 3), which are presented here for the first time in a critical edition based on all seven manuscripts of the text. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Theorie des Unendlichen in dem kurz vor 1400 verfaßten Kommentar des Lorenz von Lindores zur „Physik" des Aristoteles, der im 15. Jh. eine wichtige Rolle spielte bei der Verbreitung der Naturphilosophie Johannes Buridans und seiner Schüler. Im ersten Teil des Buches wird die Wissenschaftstheorie Lindores' in ihren Grundzügen dargestellt, danach werden seine Ausführungen zum Unendlichen und zu damit zusammenhängenden Themen (Struktur des Kontinuums, Ewigkeit der Welt) detailliert analysiert. Abschließend wird eine Bewertung dieser Theorien aus der Sicht der modernen Mathematik versucht, wobei sich bemerkenswerte Ähnlichkeiten zwischen mittelalterlichen Theorien des Unendlichen und neueren Entwicklungen in der Mathematik zeigen. Der zweite Teil bietet erstmals eine kritische Edition aller einschlägigen Quaestionen aus Lindores' Physikkommentar (Buch I, qu. 1-5, 10; Buch III, qu. 13-18; Buch VI, qu. 9-10; Buch VIII, qu. 3) auf der Basis aller sieben Handschriften des Textes. (shrink)

Ziel des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist es, die Existenz von eventuellen Berührungspunkten zwischen Wittgenstein und Ingarden nachzuweisen. Nach einer kurzen Einführung wird anfangs der Hintergrund der Analyse des Problems formuliert. Darauf hin werden die Positionen Wittgensteins Ontologie mit wenigen Begriffen und Ingardens dreistufige Ontologie jeweils skizzenhaft dargestellt und kritisch auf das Vorhandensein von gemeinsamen Grundlinien geprüft. Als Gesichtspunkte gelten dabei folgende Begriffe: Ontologie, Welt und Mensch, Sprache und Ästhetik. Abschließend werden die charakteristischen Merkmale von Berührungspunkten genannt.

Es ist ein verbreitetes Phänomen unserer moralischen Urteilspraxis, dass wir herausragende moralische Handlungen bisweilen als moralisch wertvoll und dennoch nicht als moralisch geboten beurteilen, d.i. als supererogatorisch. Für die kantische Ethik stellt diese Beobachtung eine Herausforderung dar. Nicht nur verfügt sie nicht über eine Kategorie der Supererogation, vielmehr scheinen die wenigen Stellen, an denen sich Kant explizit mit moralisch herausragendem Handeln befasst, auf den ersten Blick dafür zu sprechen, dass eine solche Urteilspraxis schlicht als fehlerhaft zurückzuweisen ist. (...) Dagegen arbeitet die Studie heraus, dass die kantische Ethik einen theoretischen Rahmen für eine nuancierte moralpsychologische Analyse dieser Praxis bietet: Moralisch herausragende Handlungen als supererogatorisch zu betrachten erweist sich demnach einerseits als vielschichtige Gefährdung der eigenen Moralität, andererseits vermag das gute Exempel anderer unter bestimmten Bedingungen durchaus zur Beförderung der eigenen Moralität beizutragen. Die Studie trägt zu einem differenzierteren Verständnis der kantischen Ethik bei und weist eine genuin kantische Perspektive auf Supererogation als systematisch anschlussfähig an aktuelle Debatten aus. (shrink)

In its first part, the article reconstructs descriptions of corporal perception of simultaneity.concepts and categories of time are secondary to these perceptions and objectified by means of language. In a second part, with reference to system theory, the perspective is turned around, so that simultaneity is discussed as a secondary mode of social relations and the inner stream of consciousness; in this view, simultaneity is based on world experience and techniques of synchronization. In conclusion, the paper analyses how modern electronic (...) mass media and especially television produces and manipulates autonomously worldwide synchronization. German Der Aufsatz rekonstruiert im ersten Teil sozialphänomenologische Beschreibungen der leibfundierten Erfahrung von Gleichzeitigkeit. Abstrakte Zeitvorstellungen und Zeitkategorien sind dem nachgeordnet und werden mittels Sprache objektiviert. Im zweiten Teil wird mit Bezug auf die soziologische Systemtheorie die Perspektive umgedreht und diskutiert, ob Gleichzeitigkeit nicht vielmehr ein nachrangiger Modus sozialer Beziehungen sowie des inneren Bewusstseinsstroms ist und grundlegend auf Welterfahrung und Techniken der Uhrenkoordination respektive Isochronie beruht. Abschließend wird untersucht, wie moderne elektronische Massenmedien, insbesondere das Fernsehen, weltweite Synchronisation herstellen und diese eigenständig manipulieren. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz rekonstruiert im ersten Teil sozialphänomenologische Beschreibungen der leibfundierten Erfahrung von Gleichzeitigkeit. Abstrakte Zeitvorstellungen und Zeitkategorien sind dem nachgeordnet und werden mittels Sprache objektiviert. Im zweiten Teil wird mit Bezug auf die soziologische Systemtheorie die Perspektive umgedreht und diskutiert, ob Gleichzeitigkeit nicht vielmehr ein nachrangiger Modus sozialer Beziehungen sowie des inneren Bewusstseinsstroms ist und grundlegend auf Welterfahrung und Techniken der Uhrenkoordination respektive Isochronie beruht. Abschließend wird untersucht, wie moderne elektronische Massenmedien, insbesondere das (Live-)Fernsehen, weltweite Synchronisation herstellen und diese eigenständig (...) manipulieren. (shrink)

The purpose of the present paper is to consider the traditional interpretive problems of quantum mechanics from the viewpoint of a modal ontology of properties. In particular, we will try to delineate a quantum ontology that (i) is modal, because describes the structure of the realm of possibility, and (ii) lacks the ontological category of individual. The final goal is to supply an adequate account of quantum non-individuality on the basis of this ontology.

[The review is in German] Theunissen has developed an interesting account of metaphilosophy that–as a discipline–does not start in 1960s, but already and especially with Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The constant growth of philosophical theories around 1800 (what Koselleck called “Sattelzeit”) made metaphilosophical constructions necessary. He reads–and is not the first author who does so–Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as a metaphilosophical theory. Although I like and share many ideas with Theunissen, there are three objections that I raise in my review: (...) (i) His account of isosthenia as a basic problem behind all philosophical positions (which makes metaphilosophy necessary) undermines the importance of dissent, dogmatism and intra-philosophical struggles; (ii) Theunissen’s understanding of metaphilosophy is not neutral (just as any account of metaphilosophy): it is predetermined by Hegel’s thought and the author’s understanding of Phenomenology of Spirit; (iii) Therefore, it fits well to this particular work of Hegel, but not (a) to the overall system of Encyclopedia and (b) Kant’s metaphilosophical deliberations (which Theunissen misses). I end the review with the statement that we need to ask ourselves how metaphilosophy is possible as a unified discipline despite of different philosophical backgrounds of authors–we need a meta-metaphilosophy or a critique of metaphilosophical reason. (shrink)

Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S (...) hat die Überzeugung vom Inhalt p oder q. (3) S hat demgemäß die Begründung für seine Überzeugung, daß p oder q; und zwar kraft der Begründung, die es für die Überzeugung, daß p, hat. (4) Was q betrifft, so hat S gar keine epistemischen Gründe (weder für noch gegen q). (5) p erweist sich als falsch, q ist dagegen (dank eines Zufalls) wahr. -/- Wir argumentieren, daß die philosophische Bedeutung des Rätsels von Gettier in der Regel stark überschätzt wird. Das Subjekt S hat eine gute Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. Trotzdem ist der Inhalt seiner Überzeugung nicht einfach p, sondern stattdessen p oder q. Eine solche Über¬zeu¬gung wäre verständlich, wenn S für q noch eine unabhängige Begründung hätte. Kraft der Voraussetzung hat es jedoch keine solche Begründung. Das Gettiersche Subjekt hat in diesem Sinne gratis abgeschwächte Überzeugungen. Wir argumentieren, daß solche Überzeugungen nicht nur aus den psychologischen, sondern auch aus gewissen im weiten Sinne logischen Gründen ausgeschloßen werden soll, und versuchen die Regeln zu formulieren, die solche gratis abgeschwächten Überzeugungen ausschließen. (shrink)

TOPOLOGIE DES LOGOS UND KANT-INTERPRET A TION § I. Topologie des Logos Die Geschichte der Philosophie ist die Geschichte der Entwicklung des Logos. Jedes System der Philosophie hat seinen Logos. Jedes System der Philosophie, welches seinen Logos hat, ist vom Standpunkte der Entwicklung der Philosophie als Ganzem gesehen eine notwendige Entwicklung des Logos. Die Geschichte der Philosophie ist, wie Hegel sagte, eine Entwicklung des absoluten Geistes. Aber diese Entwicklung des Logos soll man nicht als dialektische Entwicklung, wie Hegel (...) sie sah, bezeichnen. Vielmehr befindet sich das System der Hegelschen Philosophie selber an einer besonderen Stelle der Entwicklung des Logos. Die Entwicklung des Logos ist nicht immer dialektisch-formelle Entwicklung und wird nicht in Dialektik bis zum Äußersten getrieben. Wir müssen uns davor hüten, die Entwicklung des Logos formell dialek tisch zu sehen. Vielmehr müssen wir die Entwicklung des Logos - in der Phase der notwendigen Entwicklung, in der er sich befinde- positiv betrachten. Dialektische Konstruktion der Geschichte der Philosophie auf Kosten der Tatsachen, wie Hegel sie trieb, ist dogma tisch-idealitisches Verhalten, und unser Verhalten soll nicht solches sein. Betrachten wir positiv die Entwicklung des Logos in der Geschich te der Philosophie, so entsteht nicht dialektische Geschichtsauffassung, sondern Topologie der Entwicklung des Logos: kurz, die Topologie des Logo::. Nach der Topologie des Logos wird jedem System der Philoso phie sein Topos in der Entwicklung des Logos als Ganzem gegeben. (shrink)

The title of the paper is an allusion to Philip K. Dick’s book Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (which inspired the movie Blade Runner) and aims, at once, to highlight the (possible) relation between Criminal Law and Artificial Intelligence in its two dimensions of criminal protection (hence the reference to ‘electric crimes’) and criminal liability (hence the reference to the androids’ dreams), within the background problem of knowing whether Artificial Intelligence is truly mind. The purpose of this paper (...) is, precisely, to identify whether there is indeed such relation, in those two dimensions, and making use of a mediating concept, the concept of ‘mind (or ‘mentality’). I argue that Artificial Intelligence “specimens” do not have a mind and, therefore, its protection and regulation by Criminal Law is impaired. I conclude by presenting a choice between a total irrelevance model of Artificial Intelligence to Criminal Law and a model in which Artificial Intelligence emerges as object and subject of Criminal Law by analogy with persons. (shrink)

An interdisciplinary examination of the epistemology of legal history, which deals with such basic concepts as the subject, object, limits, and internal structure of legal-historical cognizance. Section headings: The evolution of legal-historical cognizance. On the foundations and limits of the subject of legal-historical cognizance. Disciplinary space of legal-historical cognizance. Philosophical historical discourse in legal comprehension.

In this article, I discuss Otto Neurath’s philosophy in the context of Vienna Circle modernism. Following recent scholarship, the discussion considers as a starting point Neurath’s participation at the fourth International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM IV). However, the image of Neurath’s modernism that results from this perspective is incomplete because it tends to overlook the importance of scientific utopianism in Neurath’s thought. Scientific utopianism is a methodology proposed by Neurath for the social sciences in technological contexts, in which scientists (...) elaborate and develop plans (utopias) for the transformation of society, thus contributing to an informed societal debate. Decisions are nevertheless kept outside the domain of scientific activity. I claim that recognizing the centrality of scientific utopianism in Neurath’s philosophy is fundamental to understand Neurath’s modernism. This interpretation highlights the affinities of Neurath’s philosophy of the social sciences with the modern utopianism of H. G. Wells. Both authors consider that there can be no ultimate solution to social problems but that a plural and constant debate of proposals is fundamental for the improvement of society. Therefore, Neurath’s modernism connects his philosophy of science to the literary utopian tradition. (shrink)

Der Vortrag hat folgendes zum Ziel – das Dasein und die Universalität der Lebenswelt-Problematik sogar in solchen Fällen zu betonen, wenn sie vom philosophischen Grundeinschlag und der Orientierung auf eine streng wissen¬schaftliche Weltsicht sowie Bildung der entsprechenden theoretischen Konstruktionen scheinbar ausgeschlossen wird, wie es in der Philosophie I. Kants der Fall ist. In diesem Vortrag möchte ich über Lebenswelt als eine primäre, theoretisch unreflektierte Struktur der Weltauffassung und Weltsicht sprechen, die selbst wissenschaftlich-theoretischen Konstruktionen zugrunde liegt. Es besteht kein (...) Zweifel daran, dass die Lebenswelt ausschliesslich von einer Ganzheit historisch wandelbarer Phänomene, einem eigenartigen “historischen aapriori” gebildet werden kann. Mein Vortrag richtet sich gegen den Partikularisierungsprozess und die antiratio-nalistischen Tendenzen im Postmodernismus, gegen Versuchungen das Allgemeine (d. i., auch die Lebenswelt) in beliebigen Äußerungsformen zu verleugnen. (shrink)

This essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this. On the one hand, many Naiyāyikas accept what I will call the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge, the view that a conscious experience or thought is (...) a knowledge-event just in case it is true and non-recollective. On the other hand, they are also committed to what I shall call Nyāya Infallibilism, the thesis that every knowledge-event is produced by causes that couldn’t have given rise to an error. These two commitments seem to conflict with each other in cases of epistemic luck, i.e., cases where an agent arrives a true judgement accidentally or as a matter of luck. While the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge seems to predict that these judgements are knowledge-events, Nyāya Infallibilism seems to entail that they aren’t. In this essay, I show that Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the 14th century Naiyāyika, solves this problem by adopting what I call epistemic localism, the view that upstream causal factors play no epistemically significant role in the production of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the particular problems raised by observations of phenomena outside the common course of nature for their validation as knowledge. It examines to what extent the content of the reports and, in particular, their lack of intrinsic plausibility affected the methods used in their authentication and the assessment of testimony at the Royal Society in the first half of the eighteenth century. I show that literary strategies were usually necessary but not sufficient for the validation of (...) these kinds of observations. Next, I discuss why visual representations were especially useful in establishing the singularity of the observations, but I point out that their high costs and other restrictions meant that they were not so widespread. In contrast I show that, for a long period of time, testimony was used in the majority of the reports as the true stamp of authenticity. I note, however, that the Royal Society accepted reports by authors of varied social status, level of education and occupation, and I discuss some of the factors responsible for the complexity of the handling of testimony at the Society. I argue against Shapin that in the case of reports of extraordinary phenomena, the competence of the reporter and witnesses was often more important than their social status. The increasing role of expertise in the assessment of observations at the Society become especially apparent by the middle of the eighteenth century.Author Keywords: Authentication; Competence; Monstrous births; Singular; Testimony; Royal Society of London. (shrink)

Possuímos sentimentos divergentes com relação a aspectos do presente: somos otimistas com relação à expansão da democracia e cautelosos com relação à aplicação intensa da técnica. Indago se é possível manter esses dois sentimentos divergentes a partir de uma análise da situação cultural que produziu as noções atuais de natureza e sujeito – os respectivos fundamentos da técnica e da democracia contemporâneas. Constato que o sistema técnico-democrático, do qual essas noções emergiram, impõe uma conexão específica entre a natureza e o (...) sujeito, de tal forma que o movimento produzido em uma delas afeta necessariamente a outra. Portanto, democracia e técnica se constituem como as duas faces de uma mesma moeda e não devem ser tratadas de maneira abstrata, como dois elementos distintos. As tentativas de identificação de problemas e de proposição de soluções sobre a técnica e a democracia tenderão a produzir resultados inócuos se partirem dessa perspectiva abstrata que os representa como dois elementos separados da vida contemporânea.: We have different feelings about aspects of the actual world: we are optimistic about the expansion of democracy and cautious about the technique’s intense application. I ask if it’s possible to keep these two conflicting feelings from an analysis of the cultural situation that produced the current notions of nature and subject – the respective foundations of contemporaries technique and democracy. I note the technical democratic system, which these notions have emerged, imposes a specific connection between nature and subject, such that the movement produced in one necessarily affects another. Therefore, democracy and technique constitute as two sides of the same coin and should not be treated abstractly as two distinct elements. Attempts to identify problems and propose solutions about the technique and democracy will tend to produce innocuous results if they start from this abstract point of view that represent them as two separate elements of contemporary life. Keywords: Technique; Democracy; Nature; Subjectivity; Technical Democratic System. (shrink)

In the present paper, i propose, first, to present some aspects of what we may call a type of "phenomenology" of the image contained in the Berlin lectures on transcendental logic – notably, in the second of these courses in Berlin. Second, i would like to return to the problem of the relationship between logic and philosophy, starting from these indications with regard to the "image", and, if possible, outline some parallel with certain theses on the same subject from (...) the Jena years. Finally, in what i consider a novelty concerning these lessons, i would like to conclude my exposition by raising the question of the foundational character of Fichte’s project. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures hegave in Göttingen in 1901 and other related texts of the same period,a problem that had occupied Husserl since the beginning of 1890, whenhe was planning a never published sequel to Philosophie der Arithmetik(1891). In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced,independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness (definiteness in Husserl'sterminology) for (...) a formal axiomatic system. I present and discuss these notionshere, establishing also parallels between Husserl's and Hilbert's notions ofcompleteness. (shrink)

In the first year of the twentieth century, in Gottingen, Husserl delivered two talks dealing with a problem that proved central in his philosophical development, that of imaginary elements in mathematics. In order to solve this problem Husserl introduced a logical notion, called “definiteness”, and variants of it, that are somehow related, he claimed, to Hilbert’s notions of completeness. Many different interpretations of what precisely Husserl meant by this notion, and its relations with Hilbert’s ones, have been proposed, (...) but no consensus has been reached. In this paper I approach this question afresh and thoroughly, taking into consideration not only the relevant texts and context, as others have also done before, but, more importantly, Husserl’s philosophy, his intuition-based epistemology in particular. Based on a system of clearly defined concepts that I here present, I reinforce an interpretation—definiteness as a form of syntactic completeness—that has, I believe, some advantages vis-à-vis alternative interpretations. It is in conformity with the available texts; it makes clear that Husserl’s notion of definiteness is indeed close to Hilbert’s notions of completeness; it solves the important problem of imaginaries for which it was created; and last, but not least, it fits naturally into Husserl’s system of concepts and ideas. (shrink)

In the first year of the twentieth century, in Gottingen, Husserl delivered two talks dealing with a problem that proved central in his philosophical development, that of imaginary elements in mathematics. In order to solve this problem Husserl introduced a logical notion, called “definiteness”, and variants of it, that are somehow related, he claimed, to Hilbert’s notions of completeness. Many different interpretations of what precisely Husserl meant by this notion, and its relations with Hilbert’s ones, have been proposed, (...) but no consensus has been reached. In this paper I approach this question afresh and thoroughly, taking into consideration not only the relevant texts and context, as others have also done before, but, more importantly, Husserl’s philosophy, his intuition-based epistemology in particular. Based on a system of clearly defined concepts that I here present, I reinforce an interpretation—definiteness as a form of syntactic completeness—that has, I believe, some advantages vis-à-vis alternative interpretations. It is in conformity with the available texts; it makes clear that Husserl’s notion of definiteness is indeed close to Hilbert’s notions of completeness; it solves the important problem of imaginaries for which it was created; and last, but not least, it fits naturally into Husserl’s system of concepts and ideas. (shrink)

Some philosophers accept what I call minimalist views about composition. They either deny that composition ever occurs, or they only allow that composition occurs when some things are taken up into a life. While minimalists often take their views to be somewhat revisionary, they usually want to distinguish their views from truly radical views such as the view that there is no external world at all. They often do this by noting that, although they don’t believe that there are tables, (...) chairs, or planets, they do believe that there are mereological simples arranged tablewise, chairwise, and planetwise. In this paper, I appeal to the nature of perceptual experience to present a problem for this move. I contend that, given some plausible assumptions, compositional minimalists cannot consistently maintain that they are justified in their minimalism and justified in believing propositions about the arrangements of mereological simples. I will argue that this commits such minimalists to external world skepticism. (shrink)

In this essay, my aim is to explain Vātsyāyana’s solution to a problem that arises for his theory of liberation. For him and most Nyāya philosophers after him, liberation consists in the absolute cessation of pain. Since this requires freedom from embodied existence, it also results in the absolute cessation of pleasure. How, then, can agents like us be rationally motivated to seek liberation? Vātsyāyana’s solution depends on what I will call the Pain Principle, i.e., the principle that we (...) should treat all aspects of our embodied existence as pain. If we were to follow this advice, we would come to apply the label of pain to all aspects of our embodied existence, including pleasure. This would undermine our attachment to our own embodied existence. I show that this fits with Vātsyāyana’s general theory of motivation. According to this theory, by manipulating the labels using which we think about the world and ourselves, we can induce radical shifts in our patterns of motivation. (shrink)

In this paper I study the variants of the notion of completeness Husserl pre-sented in “Ideen I” and two lectures he gave in Göttingen in 1901. Introduced primarily in connection with the problem of imaginary numbers, this notion found eventually a place in the answer Husserl provided for the philosophically more im-portant problem of the logico-epistemological foundation of formal knowledge in sci-ence. I also try to explain why Husserl said that there was an evident correlation between his and (...) Hilbert’s notion of completeness introduced in connection with the axiomatisation of geometry and the theory of real numbers when, as many commen-tators have already observed, these two notions are independent. I show in this paper that if a system of axioms is complete in Husserl’s sense, then its formal domain, the manifold of formal objects it determines, does not admit any extension. This is precisely the idea behind Hilbert’s notion of completeness in question. Therefore, the correlation Husserl noted indeed exists. But, in order to see it, we must consider the formal domain determined by a formal theory, not its models. (shrink)

Utopias are embedded in contexts from which they derive meaning and significance. As a vehicle for speculation, intervention, and creativity, narrative utopia reflects the circumstances of its times, including its culture's relationship to the past. This article offers a survey of ways in which utopias engage with the problematics of historical memory both by looking to the past in the “real” world or in a mythical world and by positing fictional peoples with their own historical memory/ies, as instanced in legends, (...) libraries, works of art, and so on. The erasure or falsification of memory, on the other hand, appears as an important leitmotif of the dystopian imagination. By pointing out a variety of examples and issues, the article will attempt to bridge the existing gap between utopian studies and cultural memory studies. (shrink)

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, (...) but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it's perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it's not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality. (shrink)

In this first paper of a series of works on the foundations of science, we examine the significance of logical and mathematical frameworks used in foundational studies. In particular, we emphasize the distinction between the order of a language and the order of a structure to prevent confusing models of scientific theories with first-order structures, and which are studied in standard model theory. All of us are, of course, bound to make abuses of language even in putatively precise contexts. This (...) is not a problem—in fact, it is part of scientific and philosophical practice. But it is important to be sensitive to the dierent uses that structure, model, and language have. In this paper, we examine these topics in the context of classical logic; only in the last section we touch upon briefly on non-classical ones. (shrink)

I discuss here the pragmatic problem in the philosophy of mathematics, that is, the applicability of mathematics, particularly in empirical science, in its many variants. My point of depart is that all sciences are formal, descriptions of formal-structural properties instantiated in their domain of interest regardless of their material specificity. It is, then, possible and methodologically justified as far as science is concerned to substitute scientific domains proper by whatever domains —mathematical domains in particular— whose formal structures bear relevant (...) formal similarities with them. I also discuss the consequences to the ontology of mathematics and empirical science of this structuralist approach. (shrink)

I discuss here the pragmatic problem in the philosophy of mathematics, that is, the applicability of mathematics, particularly in empirical science, in its many variants. My point of depart is that all sciences are formal, descriptions of formal-structural properties instantiated in their domain of interest regardless of their material specificity. It is, then, possible and methodologically justified as far as science is concerned to substitute scientific domains proper by whatever domains —mathematical domains in particular— whose formal structures bear relevant (...) formal similarities with them. I also discuss the consequences to the ontology of mathematics and empirical science of this structuralist approach. (shrink)

The discussion between Thrasymachus and Socrates in Book I of Plato's Republic instead the question about justice started with Cephalus. Thrasymachus is an important character, who relates justice to the city government. This causes justice to leave individual sphere and enter public sphere. In our article, we want to verify how Thrasymachus' theses on justice and whether they are consistent with each other. The problem of consistency of theses is old among commentators and presents different solutions. Our intention is (...) to propose a solution to the problem and to relate this to art of government proposed by Thrasymachus. This allows us to verify the manner in which Socrates and Thrasymachus differ in their proposals for government and types of ruler. In this way, our work intends to contribute with literature on the role played by Thrasymachus in Plato’s work. (shrink)

RESUMO: Fruto de longa maturação filosófica desde a sua estada em Jena, e instado a isso pelas influências de Karl L. Reinhold e Johann G. Fichte, o poeta Novalis produz, a partir do outono de 1795, um conjunto de anotações fragmentárias sobre a filosofia de Fichte, hoje conhecidas como Fichte-Studien. De entre os importantes temas aí abordados, um revela-se particularmente interessante: o tema do estatuto da Filosofia no seio do problema da autocompreensão do Eu -, e mais concretamente, o necessário (...) pensar da filosofia sobre si própria, as alterações que no processo têm de sobrevir à própria filosofia e a repercussão disto na compreensão de si próprio do Eu. Nesta senda, o seguinte ensaio propõe-se mostrar como, para Novalis, a filosofia é o natural pensar do homem, e como para além disto é a própria filosofia, com o decorrer do seu pensamento sobre si própria, que molda o curso da compreensão de si próprio do Eu: quer tendo com o Eu uma origem comum, nascendo com ele, lançando-o para o mundo e cindindo a união originária em que ele de outro modo sempre estaria, quer, por fim, afirmando-se como carência deste, ou como algo por que o Eu e a própria filosofia têm de passar no seu curso, para que possam experienciar a perda, e almejar à recuperação dessa origem. ABSTRACT: Fruit of a long philosophical maturation that began with his stay in Jena, and encouraged by the influence of Karl L. Reinhold and Johann G. Fichte, the poet Novalis produced, from autumn 1795 on, a set of fragmentary notes on the philosophy of Fichte. These are now known as Fichte-Studien. Among the important issues treated in the notes, one appears particularly interesting: the treatment of the theme of philosophy within the problem of the self-understanding of the "I" - and, more specifically, the need for philosophy to think about itself, about the changes that must come upon philosophy during this process, and about the impact of these on the self-understanding of the "I". The present article aims to show how, for Novalis, philosophy is the natural thought of man. Furthermore, it aims to show how philosophy, in the course of its thought on itself, shapes the course of the self-understanding of the "I", having with the "I" a common origin, being born with it, launching it into the world, cleaving the original union in which it otherwise would always be, and finally asserting itself as a lack of this union, something through which the "I" and philosophy itself must pass in their course so they can experience this loss and aim to recover its source. (shrink)

In 2019, Christia Mercer has published a paper in which she does a reassessment of the 2015 debate between Garber and Della Rocca on what would be the correct interpretation of Spinoza. Following Mercer, the two philosophers instantiated two main positions regarding the concept and the methodology of doing history of philosophy, namely, contextualism and appropriationism. As Mercer puts it, it is pivoted around the acceptance or rejection of one single principle, i.e. the “Getting Things Right Constraint” (GTRC), which can (...) be rendered as the clause that forbids the attribution of claims or ideas to historical figures without concern for whether or not they are ones the figures would recognize as their own. However, rather than be an undoubtful principle, it conceals a great number of tough questions about the very meaning of what one should understand by “getting things right”. Following what Mulligan names the “Austrian approach” to the history of philosophy, this paper aims to unfold some aspects of Brentano’s “philosophy of history of philosophy” to look for his contributions to a problem that was already present at the origins of contemporary philosophy. Keywords: Brentano. Contextualism. Appropriationism. History of Philosophy. (shrink)

The characterization of thought as a subject reflection about a given object is expressed by an enunciation of predicative order. The introduction of the possibility of a type of thought that it is not constituted in virtue of this presupposition brings a lot of difficulties, which is responsible for why Lloyd treats this theme as an enigma of Greek philosophy, i.e, non-discursive thinking. Plotinus seems to make a distinction between rational and intellectual thought, taking as a starting point the _sui (...) generis_ definition of a thinking that thinks itself. The intriguing nature of this description, i.e, the self-thinking as non-discursive thought, has raised studies with the primary aim to understand how it works this type of thinking. Then to clarify what does it mean to adopt the non-discursive approach. This paper intends to analyze the cited problem in the light of the “non-predicative” of Santos. The hypothesis is that by applying this concept to the discussion it will contribute to increase clarification on the distinction between reason and Intellect. That exercise will be conducted in majority through the reading of V.3 [49] of Plotinus _Enneads_. The nature of the intellectual thought would be non-predicative and the rational would be predicative. (shrink)

I discuss some questions of quantum physics, for instance the validity and limitations of the basic language of set theory to deal with problems related to elementary particles. I also present a sketch of a formalization of a “metaphysics of structures”, which might be useful for a kind of “ontic structural realism”, and briefly review the concept of quasi-truth, which underlies my way of understanding scientific theories and the scientific activity.

J. Gorczyca doziert Ethik an der Gregorianischen Universität in Rom. In seinem Entwurf einer christlichen Ethik geht er über die traditionelle Auffassung einer philosophischen Ethik hinaus, einer Ethik, die sich der deduktiven Methode bedient, um mit Kraft der Vernunft normative Prinzipien für das menschliche Handeln systematisch aufzubauen. Dagegen betrachtet Gorczyca die philosophische Ethik aus der anthropologischen Perspektive, d.h. aus der Perspektive des Subjektes des ethischen Denkens. Der objektive Hauptinhalt seiner Ethik bekommt dadurch eine neue Dimension.

Can mental causation be naturalised without being eliminated? Thomas Buchheim argues that it can, proposing a neo-Aristotelian account dubbed "Horizontal Dualism". In this paper I assess this proposal. This article is part of a series of articles commenting on Thomas Buchheim's target article "Neuronenfeuer und seelische Tat. Ein neoaristotelischer Vorschlag zum Verständnis mentaler Kausalität", published in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119,2 (2012), 332-346. The article was reprinted in: Mentale Verursachung [Mental Causation], ed. by Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, (Jahrbuch-Kontroversen 1), Freiburg: Alber, 2014.

Resumo: Eu mostro neste artigo que Schopenhauer e Bergson, mesmo abordando o problema da ação livre a partir de pontos de vista filosóficos opostos, concordam em caracterizar as ações humanas de um modo que não é nem determinista, nem compatível com a tese do liberum arbitrium. Schopenhauer, embora equivocadamente tente demonstrar a necessidade de tais ações, é obrigado a reconhecê-las como grundlos e imprevisíveis, enquanto Bergson, embora pretenda mostrá-las como sendo livres, ao final admite que elas não são objeto de (...) uma escolha através da razão. Essa coincidência inesperada entre ambos os filósofos, a respeito do problema da liberdade da ação humana, será explorada neste texto.: I show in this paper that Schopenhauer and Bergson, although approaching the problem of free action from opposed philosophical standpoints, agree in characterizing human actions in a way which is neither determinist nor compatible with the liberum arbitrium thesis. Schopenhauer, although mistakenly trying to demonstrate the necessity of such actions, is obliged to recognize then as grundlos and unpredictable. Bergson, although intending to show such actions as free, in the end admits that they are not a matter of a reasonable choice. It is this unexpected agreement between both philosophers on the problem of the freedom of human action that will be explored in this paper. (shrink)

Resumo: Tendo como foco principal o primeiro volume de Humano, demasiado humano, e em particular o primeiro capítulo desta obra, este texto visa, esquematicamente, a apontar o objetivo central da formulação do livro, que, ao nosso ver - e esta é a ideia aqui defendida - é de ordem política. Para tanto, num primeiro momento, procuramos expor o problema sócio-político em questão para Nietzsche, de forma que, num segundo, possamos esboçar a solução epistêmica, para, por fim, abordarmos as dificuldades dela (...) decorrentes.: Having as main focus the book Human, All Too Human I, and in particular the first chapter of this work, this text aims, schematically, to point out the central objective of the formulation of the book, which, in our view - and this is the idea defended here - is of a political nature. Therefore, in a first moment, we try to expose the socio-political problem seen by Nietzsche, so that, in a second, we can outline the epistemic solution, so that, finally, we can address the difficulties that arise from it. (shrink)

I carry out in this paper a philosophical analysis of the principle of excluded middle (or, as it is often called in the version I favor here, principle of bivalence: any meaningful assertion is either true or false). This principle has been criticized, and sometimes rejected, on the charge that its validity depends on presuppositions that are not, some believe, universally obtainable; in particular, that any well-posed problem is solvable. My goal here is to show that, although excluded middle (...) does indeed rest on certain presuppositions, they do not have the character of hypotheses that may or may not be true, or matters of fact that may or may not be the case. These presuppositions have, I claim, a transcendental character. Hence, the acceptance of excluded middle does not necessarily require, as some have claimed, an allegiance to ontological realism or some sort of cognitive optimism, construed as factual theses concerning the ontological status of domains of objects and our capability of accessing them cognitively. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333. (shrink)